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INTRODUcTION AND HISTORICAI BACKGROUND

Although Skidmore v. Swift & Co.1 was decided almost fifty
years ago, it remains the authoritative statement on the role of
interpretive rules in administrative law. As the courts increasingly
defer to agency interpretations of statutes, Skidmore becomes even
more meaningful in the scope of review area. Skidmore established
a doctrine of cautious deference with regard to agency interpretations. In contrast, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.' mandated deference to any reasonable agency
interpretation. As agencies may exercise a variety of powers,
courts evaluating agency rules have available to them both the
Skidmore and Chevron deference principles. The two principles are
distinct, and properly apply to discrete situations. The courts, however, have intertwined the Skidmore and the Chevron principles,
applying the Chevron doctrine of extreme deference to Skidmore
situations. This has led to the mistaken assumption that Chevron
has completely eviscerated the significance of Skidmore. In order
to combat the swallowing of the Skidmore decision by the Chevron tiger, the courts must recognize and preserve the fundamental
differences between the Skidmore and the Chevron deference
principles. The Supreme Court did just that last year in Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil
Co. (Aramco)3
The intricate web of administrative agencies in the federal
system is often referred to as the "Fourth Branch" of govern1. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
2. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

3. 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
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ment.4 Agencies not only adjudicate claims, but also make rules
and regulations that reflect their interpretations of congressional
statutes. As the interpretive role of agencies has grown, the courts
have grappled with the question of what level of deference to give
agency opinions.
The courts' difficulty in arriving at the proper standard of
review is attributable to the agency's overlapping functions, as
legislature, executive, and judiciary. An agency's regulations and
guidelines resemble congressional legislation; its enforcement and
prosecutorial roles are examples of executive powers; and its interpretation of congressional statutes is an exercise of a judicial function.' When evaluating agency action, a court must evaluate the
agency action itself; but ultimately a court's review of the agency's
judgment will depend on which governmentAl power the agency
was exercising when it acted.
Before determining the appropriate level of judicial deference
to agency action, it is important to note the fundamental distinction between two types of agency rules: legislative and interpretive.' Legislative rules derive their force from a congressional

4. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
5. See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA.
L. REV. 549, 564-67 (1985) (noting the difficulty of defining the term "deference").
6. There is necessarily a tension between courts and agencies when agencies assume
an interpretive role. Any sort of deference by a court to an administrative agency's interpretation of a congressional act could be seen as an abdication of the judicial function.
See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 CoLuM. L. REV. 452, 452 n.4 (1989).
"It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Justice Marshall
based much of his reasoning in Marbury on Alexander Hamilton's Federalist Paper No.
78: "The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts."
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
From the inception of our democracy, the conflict regarding the structural role of
the judiciary was bound to collide with the establishment of executive agencies. One of
the most prominent cases touching on this conflict is Marbury itself.
7. See 2 KENNETH C. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 7:8-7:12 (2d ed.
1979). Rules can also be characterized as legislative and nonlegislative. Nonlegislative
rules make up the body of agency action that lacks a congressional grant of power and
include interpretive rules and policy statements. Professor Robert Anthony has distinguished these two types of nonlegislative rules. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive
Rules, Polhfy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use
Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DuKE L.J. 1311, 1323-27 (1992). This Note, however, uses
Davis's terminology and refers exclusively to legislative rules and interpretive rules, with
"interpretive rules" signifying nonlegislative agency action, including policy statements.
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grant of power to agencies to make law through rulemaking. The
congressional grant can be broad, general, vague, or uncertain.
To be valid, a legislative rule must be enacted pursuant to the
procedures established in the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).9 Once enacted, a legislative rule is binding on the courts
and has the same effect as a congressional statute.10
On the other hand, agencies can issue interpretive rules without exercising a congressional grant of rulemaking power. Interpretive rules can be issued in a variety of forms, including: manuals,
policy statements, staff instructibns, opinion letters, audits, correspondence, informal advice guidelines, press releases, testimony
before Congress, internal memoranda, speeches, and explanatory
statements in the Federal Register." An agency can issue an interpretive rule without adhering to the formal rulemaking procedures
or informal notice-and-comment procedures of the APA." An
interpretive rule is not binding on the courts; 3 courts may freely
substitute their judgment for that of the agency in determining
how a statute or regulation is to be implemented." An interpretive rule is "merely advisory,"15 clarifying or expressing the
agency's understanding of a statute." In reviewing an interpretive
8.
9.

DAvIS, supra note 7, § 7:10.
See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988); Samaritan Health Serv. v. Bowen, 811 F.2d 1524,

1529 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
10. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977); National Latino Media Coalition v. FCC, 816 F.2d 785, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
11. Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the
Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 2 (1990).
12. Flagstaff Medical Ctr. v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 1325, 1350 (D. Ariz. 1991), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 962 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1992); see 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988); see also
Northern Ill. Gas Co. v. United States, 833 F.2d 1582, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (IRS revenue ruling was an interpretive ruling and therefore not subject to the APA); Westcott v.
Department of Agric., 765 F.2d 121, 122 (8th Cir. 1985) (Department of Agriculture
handbook was interpretive only and therefore not subject to APA notice-and-comment
requirements).
13. However, interpretive rules may be binding on the agency itself. See, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974) ("Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is
incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures."); Prince v. Sullivan, 933 F.2d
598, 602 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Social Security rulings are 'binding on all components of the'
Administration. [They] represent precedent final opinions and orders and statements of
policy and interpretations that have been adopted by the Administration.'
(quoting 20
C.F.R. § 422.406(b)(1) (1990)).
14. See, e.g., Batterton, 432 U.S. at 425 n.9 (court is not required to give effect to
an interpretive regulation); Sciarotta v. Bowen, 735 F. Supp. 148, 151 (D.N.J. 1989) (reviewing court may use its own judgment as to what the authorizing statute may require).
15. Sciarotta, 735 F. Supp. at 151.
16. See National Latino Media Coalition v. FCC, 816 F.2d 785, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
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rule, a court may weigh the rule into its decision on how to interpret the statute, depending on the rule's persuasiveness."
Although some courts have characterized the line dividing
legislative from interpretive rules as "hazy,""8 "fuzzy, '' 19 and "enshrouded in considerable smog,""° the difference between the two
types of rules is really quite clear.2 A legislative rule is grounded
in a congressional grant of power and enacted pursuant to APA
procedures; an interpretive rule is not.' Courts that have had
difficulty with the distinction have focused on a rule's impact
instead of its origin.3 A rule is legislative if it creates new rights,
produces significant effects on private interests, or imposes obligations on the public, because only rules having the force of law
supported by a congressional grant of power could have these
effects.24 But although a rule having these substantive and intiFlagstaff, 773 F. Supp. at 1343; see infra notes 181-82 and decisions cited therein.
17. See, eg., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976); Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). As one court has noted, "[a]t bottom, the true
measure of the weight to be accorded to the [agency's] view inevitably depends upon the
persuasive force of the interpretation, given the totality of the attendant circumstances."
Bank of New York v. Hoyt, 617 F. Supp. 1304, 1314 (D.R.I. 1985) (citing Skidnore, 323.
U.S. at 140).
18. Klingler v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 738 F. Supp. 898, 903 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
19. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
20. Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir.) (referring to definition of "general statement of policy"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975).
21. See Anthony, supra note 7, at 1321.
22. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States, 622 F. Supp. 1109,
1116 (N.D. Ga. 1984), affd, 780 F.2d 720 (11th Cir. 1986); American Meat Inst. v.
Bergland, 459 F. Supp. 1308, 1314 (D.D.C. 1978).
23. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565-66 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074 (1985); Flagstaff Medical Ctr. v. Sullivan, 773 F.
Supp. 1325, 1351 (D. Ariz. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 962 F.2d 879 (9th Cir.
1992); Klingler v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 738 F. Supp. 898, 903 (E.D. Pa. 1990); see also
Anthony, supra note 7, at 1327 (insisting that origin, rather than effect, of a rule determines whether it is legislative). Even though the substantial impact test has been repudiated by the courts, some courts believe impact remains relevant to classifying a rule as
legislative or interpretive. See, e.g., Credit Union Nat'l Ass'n v. National Credit Union
Admin. Bd., 573 F. Supp. 586, 591 (D.D.C. 1983). Indeed, if an interpretive rule or policy statement has a substantial impact, some judges and scholars advocate using the notice-and-comment process. Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858, 863-64
(D. Del. 1970); Anthony, supra note 7, at 1327, 1355; see also DAVIS, supra note 7, §
7:17 (analyzing cases holding that rules with a substantial impact require the notice-andcomment procedure, but also pointing out that such rules are not thereby converted into
"legislative rules").
24. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-03 (1979) (quoting Morton v.
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232, 235, 236 (1974)).
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mate effects should be legislative, agencies sometimes try to
achieve the same ends through an interpretive rule or a policy
statement, which can be promulgated without the complicated and
confrontational procedures of legislative rulemaking.' Courts using impact as a guide would understandably find it difficult to
distinguish interpretive rules, which are legislative in nature, from
properly promulgated legislative rules. It is an entirely different
debate whether or not an agency should issue interpretive rules
that bind the public.26
In determining the appropriate level of judicial deference to
agency action, it is essential to examine the history of judicial
deference to agency rulemaking. The principles of judicial deference can be traced back to the early decisions of the Supreme
CourtY More than a century later, the growth of administrative
agencies during the New Deal compelled the Court to fit its review of agency action into its general framework of judicial review. Since then, several of the Court's decisions established principles of judicial deference to apply to agency interpretations.2
25. The rules and policies in the following cases were established by agency officials
and were not promulgated pursuant to notice-and-comment: Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct.
1759, 1764 (1991) (gag rule prohibiting discussion of abortion by health care officials
receiving federal financial assistance); Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v.
Bowen, 797 F.2d 391, 397 (7th Cir. 1986) (rule strictly interpreting utilization provisions
used to disallow Medicaid reimbursements), cert. granted, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987), and cert.
dismissed, 485 U.S. 1017 (1988); Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887, 891 (9th Cir. 1983)
(pension benefits offset by unemployment benefits), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984);
American Medical Assoc. v. Heckler, 606 F. Supp. 1422, 1440 (S.D. Ind. 1985) (rule
freezing amount providers are allowed to charge Medicare beneficiaries); Linoz v. Heckler, 598 F. Supp. 486, 490 (D. Haw. 1984) (denial of Medicare coverage for ambulance
service to distant hospital), rev'd, 800 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1986) (striking down substantive
rule because it was not promulgated in accordance with notice-and-comment procedures);
see also Wilcox v. Ives, 864 F.2d 915, 926 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Under the guise of interpretation, the Secretary has effected a fundamental change in the purpose of the statute.").
For a more complete analysis of the interpretive rule question in Rust, see Walter
Dellinger, Gag Me with a Rule: Bush and Abortion Counseling, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 6,
1992, at 14.
26. See Anthony, supra note 7, at 1315.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Vowell & M'Lean, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 368, 372 (1808)
(had it been necessary to do so, the Court would have respected the consistent construc"tion of the Treasury Department on the issue of bondlolder's duties, an area in which
the treasury had experience); see also Farina, supra note 6, at 452 n.4 (noting that the
underlying question of Marbury v. Madison involved an opportunity for judicial deference
to an administrative interpretation of the Judiciary Act of 1789).
28. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944); Batterton v. Francis,
432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
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In litigation involving an agency when the meaning of statutory language is in dispute, the agency charged with administering
that statute frequently asks the court to defer to the agency's
interpretation of the statute.' The agency may offer a variety of
documents in support of its position, including many types of
legislative or interpretive rules. Confronted with this myriad of
agency action, a court must determine the appropriate level of
judicial deference to give the agency's interpretation.
In 1944, the Supreme Court decision of Skidmore v. Swift &
Co.' established the proper role of an interpretive rule in the judicial decisionmaking process. Skidmore's deference principle requires courts to evaluate the persuasive force of such a rule, and
to give that rule weight in its decisionmaking process depending
on that force.
In Skidmore, the Supreme Court provided general principles
for courts to use when dealing with agency interpretations. The
Court explained that although the agency's opinion was valued,
the agency's interpretation of the statute at issue nonetheless could
not effectively bind the courts." It thus undertook its own evaluation of the meaning of the terms in the statute. Yet the Court afforded the agency's recommendations some consideration: it held
that the level of judicial deference to an agency opinion depends
on the persuasiveness of the agency's position as measured by the
thoroughness of its investigation in making the ruling, the validity
of its reasoning, and the consistency of the present agency position
with earlier rulings."1 Although it offered guidance to lower courts
regarding the proper relationship between a reviewing court and
an agency interpretation, Skidmore did not settle the deference
debate.32

29. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
30. Id at 139-40; see infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
31. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
32. Also in 1944, the Court developed a separate set of deference principles to
apply to agency adjudications. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 130
(1944). When evaluating agency adjudications, factual determinations would be left to the
agency whereas legal ones were left exclusively to the courts. See id. (explaining that
whether newsboys are "employees" was a question of fact left to the agency). However,
this test has proved to be problematic as questions frequently arise that mix fact and
law, and it has become increasingly difficult to apply the test consistently. See, e.g., Connecticut State Medical Soe'y v. Connecticut Bd. of Examiners in Podiatry, 546 A.2d 830
(Conn. 1988) (holding that what constitutes the foot in the human body is a question of
law); see also 2 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PRACTICE 116-17 (1st
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With the regulatory boom of the 1970s, the deference debate
moved to the forefront of the Court's docket. Although the general principles of deference established in earlier decisions remained
viable, the question for the Court was no longer "should courts
defer?" but rather "how much deference should courts give?" Two
competing lines of cases emerged from the debate: cases that
followed the checks and balances approach, and cases that followed the supervisory approach.3 Under the checks and balances
approach, a court afforded great deference to a reasonable agency
interpretation of a statute.' A court reviewed an agency's decision as it would congressional legislation and often accepted the
agency's interpretation as controlling. The strength of the agency's
opinion was bolstered by the agency's status as a co-equal "fourth
branch" of government. In contrast, under the supervisory approach, a court weighed the persuasive value of an agency's opinion in making its own evaluation of the meaning of the statute;
and the court was always free to substitute- its judgment for that
of the agency." Here, the persuasive power of the agency rested
on considerations such as its expertise, experience, and consistency
in applying the interpretation. These conflicting cases created
confusion and ambiguity in the law governing judicial deference to
agency interpretations for the next decade.36

ed. Supp. 1990) (discussing the use of a fact/law distinction in judicial review).
33. Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG.
283, 300-07 (1986). Other commentators, such as Cynthia Farina, refer to these approaches respectively as the "deferential model" and the "independent judgment model." See
Farina, supra note 6, at 453-54.
34. See, e.g., Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99 (1971) (holding that a court is
obligated to regard as controlling a reasonable, consistently applied administrative interpretation); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (holding that an
agency interpretation should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is
wrong).
35. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 289 (1974) (court conducted its own evaluation of legislative history of Taft-Hartley Act rather than accept agency
interpretation where agency interpretation was inconsistent with its earlier pronouncements); Office Employees Int'l Union v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313, 320 (1957) (refusing to
defer to agency interpretation where agency would limit its own jurisdiction); Davies
Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 156 (1944) (agency view does not outweigh
court's own interpretation of the statute); see also Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232
(1974) (court will not defer to agency's ad hoe determination of eligibility for benefits).
36. As Judge Friendly has commented:
We think that it is time to recognize . . . that there are two lines of
Supreme Court decisions on this subject which are analytically in conflict, with
the result that a court of appeals must choose the one it deems more appropriate for the case at hand. Leading cases support[ ] the view that great deference
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In 1984, in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc.,' a unanimous Court established a two-pronged test
to evaluate an agency position presented as a legislative rule. At

step one, a court determines whether the statute is ambiguous. If
the court determines that the statute is not ambiguous, then it
applies the plain meaning of the statute regardless of the agency's
interpretation. If the court finds the statute ambiguous on its face,
it moves to step two: If the court finds the agency's interpretation
reasonable, it must defer to the agency position. 8
The battleground of Chevron is step one. Almost any term of
any statute arguably can be ambiguous; courts often divide over
whether a term is ambiguous or not. 9 In addition, the Supreme
Court Justices disagree as to whether the "traditional canons of
statutory construction," such as legislative history, may be consulted in order to determine whether or not a statute is ambiguous.'
Once a court determines that a statute is ambiguous, the agency
almost always "wins" in step two. At that point, the task for the
court is simply to evaluate the reasonableness of the agency's
decision; and because a "reasonableness test" has a relatively low
threshold, in that the agency position does not have to be the only

must be given to the decisions of an administrative agency applying a statute to
the facts and that such decisions can be reversed only if without rational basis . . . However, there is an impressive body of law sanctioning free substitution of judicial for administrative judgment when the question involves the
meaning of a statutory term.
Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976) (footnotes
omitted), affd sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977).
In Pittston, the court declined to defer to the administrative agency review board because
it believed that the role of interpreting congressional legislation belonged to the courts.
544 F.2d at 48-49.
37. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
38. Id. at 844.
39. "Ambiguity seems to have taken on epidemic proportions." Panel Discussion,
Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. J53,
362 (1987) (statement of Kenneth W. Starr). For examples of instances where ambiguity
is disputed, see EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 126 n.1 (1988)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding the word "termination" unambiguous, the dissent would
not have deferred to the EEOC interpretation); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 139-40 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (finding the term "modify" unambiguous, the dissent would not have deferred to the EPA).
40. See Farina, supra note 6, at 460 nn.41-42. See also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (disapproving of the
majority's willingness to examine legislative history as a basis for imposing an interpretation of the statute at variance with its otherwise clear language).
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acceptable construction of the statute, 1 the court almost always
defers
to the agency when it reaches step two of the Chevron
42
test.

Such a sweeping deference principle could greatly circumscribe substantive judicial review of agencies' interpretations and
implementations of statutes and regulations. It is this grant of
considerable discretion and power to the agencies by the extreme
deference principle set forth in Chevron that has created one of
the biggest debates of administrative law.43 Indeed, the scope of
Chevron's extreme deference doctrine has been debated by the Supreme Court Justices."
Whereas Skidmore utilized a supervisory approach to judicial
deference, Chevron marked a significant move toward the checks
and balances approach, 5 thus perpetuating the confusion as to
the appropriate level of deference to agency interpretations. Because Chevron is a more recent decision and has an alluring simplicity, many courts and scholars consider Chevron to be the preeminent decision addressing the relationship between the courts
and administrative agencies. 46 However, a careful examination of
the Skidmore legacy reveals, that the deference principle of
Skidmore has been consistently applied by the Supreme Court
without criticism. 7 Chevron and Skidmore can in fact co-exist,
because the deference levels they articulate apply to different
types of agency action. The extreme deference of Chevron applies
41. See Farina; supra note 6, at 454.
42. See Panel Discussion, supra note 39, at 361, 366 (statement of Kenneth W.
Starr).
43.

See generally KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW OF THE EIoHTIES:

1989 SUPPLEMENT TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 518-22 (1989) (discussing how
the Chevron Court overlooked § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act and violated
its constitutional duty to review'agency action); Farina, supra note 6 (discussing Chevron
and the "constitutional unease" about the allocation of power in the administrative state);
Panel Discussion, supra note 39 (discussing the strong and weak readings of Chevron);
Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071
(1990) (discussing the limitations on the Chevron principle by other forms of statutory
construction).
44. See Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26 (1990); INS v. Cardoza,
480 U.S. 421 (1987).
45. Starr, supra note 33, at 306.
46. See id. at 307. Most commentators agree on the persuasive and contagious effect
of the Chevron decision. See Panel Discussion, supra note 39, at 356 (statement of Ronald M. Levin), 358 (statement of Kenneth W. Starr); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 512.
47. See infra note 116.
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to legislative rules; the cautious deference of Skidmore applies to
interpretive rules.
The recent Supreme Court case of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco)8 presented competing views on the relationship between Chevron and
Skidmore. In rejecting the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's (EEOC) interpretation of Title VII, the Aramco
majority applied a Skidmore analysis. Relying on factors established in Skidmore and subsequent decisions applying Skidmore,
the majority found the EEOC's position unpersuasive and therefore entitled to little weight. Although the dissenting Justices did
find the EEOC's position persuasive, their Aramco opinion 'and
votes in other cases indicated that they agreed with the majority's
view that Skidmore articulates the appropriate level of deference
for interpretive rules.49 In contrast, the concurring Justice would
have applied the two-step Chevron analysis. Finding the statute
ambiguous under step one of the Chevron analysis, and the agency
interpretation unreasonable under step two, the concurring Justice,
like the majority, would not have deferred to the EEOC. Thus
although they both declined to defer to the EEOC, the majority
and the concurrence applied different deference principles in
reaching this result.
This Note examines the role Skidmore has played in the
evolving principles of judicial deference in administrative law. It
discusses, in particular, how the Chevron deference principle has
affected the way Skidmore has been applied in the lower courts
since Chevron. The Note then focuses on Aramco and its application of the Skidmore and Chevron principles. The factions of the
Aramco Court suggest competing approaches to judicial deference
and to the role of Skidmore. This Note argues that Skidmore
deference is not only still a viable doctrine, but is also a necessary
component of the court-agency relationship.
Part I focuses on the Skidmore case and highlights its important language with respect to judicial deference to agencies. It
discusses the important case of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,'
which revived a then-dormant Skidmore doctrine. Part I then
describes how Skidmore has been adopted as the guide for the
48. 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
49. See infra Section III(C).
50. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
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courts to use to determine the proper level of deference to accord
an interpretive rule. Part II discusses the erosion of the Skidmore
doctrine. First, it comments on the courts' especially interesting
applications of Skidmore in conjunction with the Chevron analysis,
which effectively transforms Skidmore into a reasonableness test."
Then, it evaluates the view-based on the beliefs that the distinction between legislative and interpretive rules is no longer important, and the demand for consistency in agency interpretations is
no longer pressing-that Skidmore principles are no longer relevant to courts' deference determinations. Part III focuses on
Aramco, the most recent Supreme Court case to address what role
Skidmore should play in the deference debate. It also addresses
the concurrence's mistaken view that Skidmore is no longer significant to deference principles because of the erroneous conclusion
that the distinction between legislative and interpretive rules has
eroded. Finally, Part IV discusses the importance of maintaining
the distinction between legislative and interpretive rules. It also
comments on the significance of Skidmore in this arena. This Note
concludes that whereas Chevron is the authoritative case on deference to legislative rules, Skidmore is its counterpart for interpretive rules.
I.

SKIDMORE V. SWIFT & CO.

A. Skidmore's Language
The "most helpful and the most authoritative opinion on
the legal effect of interpretive rules is Skidmore v. Swift & Co."'52
At the time of the enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act

51. The cases used as illustrations are from both before and after Aramco. A comparison of the cluster of cases citing Skidmore after Aramco, to the cases citing Skidmore
after Chevron but before Aramco, did not reveal any particular trend in the application
of Skidmore. The courts did not apply Skidmore differently after Aramco. Compare
Dalheim v. KDFW-TV, 918 F.2d 1220, 1228 (5th Cir. 1990) with Greenwood Trust Co. v.
Massachusetts, 776 F. Supp. 21, 36 n.38 (D. Mass. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 971
F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1992) (both decisions applying Skidmore analysis) and compare General
.Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1564-72 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1074 (1985) with Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1584 (1992) (both decisions rejecting Skidmore analysis).
52. 2 DAVIS, supra note 7, § 7.10, at 50; see also Autrey v. Potlatch Corp., No.
C-89-3695-SBA, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12548, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 1992) (commenting that Skidmore is the "most comprehensive statement of the role of interpretative
rulings.").
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(FLSA) 3 Congress had not established an administrative factfinding body for wage and hour cases, so the courts adjudicated
these claims. However, Congress had created a position for an
Administrator who had the power to enforce employer compliance
with the FLSA, but not the power to make rules. This Administrator set forth his views of the application of the Act in interpretive bulletins and informal rulings. 4 These documents provided a
practical guide to employers and employees as to how the Administrator would seek to enforce and apply the Act. In the bulletin
relevant to the issue of this case, the Administrator thought the
"inactive duty"55 problem called for a flexible solution, and he
suggested guidelines for applying the overtime provisions of the
FLSA.56 In choosing to adopt and apply the Administrator's interpretation," the Court articulated the proper role of interpretive
rulings and their legal effect.
The Court noted that there was "no statutory provision as to
what, if any, deference courts should pay to the Administrator's
conclusions.""8 It explained that although the Administrator's interpretation could not bind a court, his opinion carried weight because of several considerations: first, the Administrator based his
construction of the Act on specialized experience and a broad
investigation; second, the guidelines created by the Administrator
would establish policy on behalf of the government and demonstrated the application of the Act; and finally, the existence of
by the Court, would allow the Act to
agency guidelines, if adopted
59
be enforced consistently.
In light of the above, the Court concluded that:

53. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988).
54. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 138 (citation omitted).
55. "Inactive duty" refers to the hours during which the plant workers were required
to stand by at assigned posts to answer fire alarms that might occur that evening. This
responsibility was part of the general fire hall duties, and was required of each worker
three or four nights a week. During this time, the workers often slept or played dominoes. The issue in the case was whether the workers were entitled to overtime compensation for part of this time under the FLSA. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,

135-36 (1944).
56. Id. at 138.
57. However, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the district court because although the district court did consider the Administrator's opinion, the court's

decision rested
tive duty." Id.
58. Id. at
59. Id. at

on an erroneous conclusion of law with respect to the meaning of "inacat 140.
139.
139-40.
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the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator
under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason
of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.'
The Skidmore decision assumed an important role in administrative law because of this language with respect to interpretive rules.
B.

Skidmore's Affirmation

In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,6 the Supreme Court relied
on Skidmore in declining to defer to the EEOC.62 In that case,
the Court's analysis of the relevant section of Title VII was inconsistent with an EEOC guideline interpreting that section.63 In resolving this conflict, the Court stated that Congress did not grant
the EEOC rulemaking power; therefore, this ruling and any ruling
of the EEOC was an interpretive one." Thus although the EEOC
interpretive ruling was entitled to consideration by the Court, it
had less persuasive power than "administrative regulations which
Congress has declared shall have the force of law, or ...

regula-

tions which under the enabling statute may themselves supply the
' The Court, citing Skidmore,
basis for imposition of liability."65
evaluated the role of interpretive rules in courts' evaluations of

60. Id. at 140.
61. 429-U.S. 125 (1976).
62. Id. at 141-43.
63. Gilbert involved a disability plan of an employer which allegedly violated Title
VII because it failed to cover pregnancy-related disabilities. Although the EEOC guideline interpreted the Act to require pregnancy-related disability benefits to be available on
the same terms as other temporary disability benefits, id. at 140-41, the Supreme Court
upheld General Electric's disability plan, stating that a pregnancy exclusion was not gender-based discrimination and thus was not covered by Title VII, id. at 145-46. In 1978,
Congress amended Title VII to include a cause of action for pregnancy discrimination:
"The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions .... ." 42

U.S.C. § 2000(e)(k) (1988).

64. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 141; see also Autrey v. Potlatch Corp., No. C-89-3695-SBA,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12548, at *12-13 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 1992).
65. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 141 (citations omitted).
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statutes and in their measurement of the rules' persuasive force.
Although the Gilbert Court did not "wholly discount the weight"
of the EEOC guideline, it concluded that the guideline did "not
receive high marks when judged by the standards enunciated in
Skidmore.- '

With respect to administrative law, Gilbert did not make new
law; rather, it confirmed the fundamental distinction between legislative and interpretive rules. 7 Gilbert firmly grounded Skidmore
as a statement of authority on the necessary degree of deference
to, and the persuasive power of, interpretive rulings. Gilbert also
demonstrated how courts could use the thoroughness, validity, and
consistency factors delineated in Skidmore as guidelines in measuring the appropriate weight to assign to agency interpretations."
Although not addressed in Skidmore, contemporaneousness is
another factor Gilbert instructed courts to consider when deciding
if deference is appropriate.
C. Skidmore's Legacy
Skidmore's discussion of the role of interpretive rules as a
guide for statutory interpretation has been affirmed repeatedly by
the courts. 9 "To the extent that a ... court finds in the interpretations an analogy useful in deciding the case before it, it may rely
on the interpretation as persuasive evidence of both Congress's
legislative intent and the Secretary's regulatory intent."7 The interpretive rules "constitute a body of experience and informed.
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance."'" At the same time, Skidmore's emphasis on the nonbinding nature of interpretive rules has also been affirmed by the
courts.'
66. Id. at 143. The Court concluded that the EEOC guideline did not "fare well"
under this standard. Id. at 142. The Court found first, that the guideline was not a contemporaneous interpretation of Title VII, and second, that the guideline contradicted an
earlier agency position. Id. Both of these factors decreased the validity of the guideline
and therefore its persuasive effect on the Court.
67. See 2 DAVIS, supra note 7, § 7.8, at 41.
68. For examples of decisions applying Skidmore as a guide, see infra notes 83-88.
69. See, e.g., Prince v. Sullivan, 933 F.2d 598, 602 (7th Cir. 1991); Kohlheim v.
Glynn County, 915 F.2d 1473, 1477 n.20 (11th Cir. 1990); Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc.,
915 F.2d 777, 781-82 (1st Cir. 1990).
70. Dalheim v. KDFw-TV, 918 F.2d 1220, 1228 (5th Cir. 1990).
71. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
72. See, e.g., Dalhein, 918 F.2d at 1228; Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 776
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In Skidmore, the Court explained the bases for deferring to
an interpretive rule of an agency: first, an agency administrator's
rulings are made "in pursuance of official duty, based upon more
specialized experience and broader investigations and information
than is likely to come to a judge in a particular case";73 and second, an agency determines policy on behalf of the government and
provides guidance for the enforcement of the statute.74 In addition, the Court noted that its acceptance of the interpretation
would allow for consistent application of the Act.75
In the majority of cases, there will be sufficient grounds for
deference as most agencies have experience or expertise in interpreting the statutes they are charged to administer. Nonetheless,
courts will not merely defer to agency interpretations;7 6 rather,
they will evaluate the statutes at issue, and will examine agency
interpretations to consider their persuasiveness. The Skidmore
Court discussed the factors to be considered when evaluating the
persuasive power of an interpretive rule: the thoroughness of the
agency's decision to issue the rule, the validity of the agency's
reasoning in making such a choice, and the consistency of the
interpretive rule at issue with earlier pronouncements by the agency on the same topic.7 The Court added that other factors to be
considered are those "which give [the rule] power to persuade, if
lacking power to control."78
Relying on this language in Skidmore, courts have considered
factors not enumerated in Skidmore when evaluating the persuasive weight of an agency interpretation. For example, in Gilbert,
an agency interpretation gained persuasive value when it was enacted contemporaneously with the statute. In other cases, agency
interpretations were persuasive 'if
consistent with the overall congressional purpose of the statute ° In still other cases, agency
F. Supp. 21, 36 n.38 (D. Mass. 1991) (agency interpretations are entitled to careful consideration but not to conclusive effect), rev'd on other grounds, 971 F.2d 818 (1st Cir.
1992).
73. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139.
74. Id. at 139-40.
75. Id. at 140.
76. See Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations Auth.,
464 U.S. 89, 97 (1983) (stating that courts must not "rubber-stamp" administrative decisions).
77. Skidtnore, 323 U.S. at 140.
78. Id.
79. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976).
80. See, e.g., West v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 1122, 1131 (3d Cir. 1989); Wilcox v. Ives, 864
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expertise was another reason to defer to interpretive rules,81 the
rationale being that with the technical administration of a statute,
agencies may be better equipped than courts to determine the way

a statute should be interpreted and applied.'
Courts have relied repeatedly on Skidmore deference principles to evaluate the soundness of an agency interpretation. 3 Some
courts weigh the thoroughness or validity factors,' whereas others

look to policy considerations' and the congressional purpose underlying the statute.' However, the overwhelming majority of
cases equate persuasiveness of the agency interpretation with con-

sistency' and contemporaneousness.' In all of these cases, if the
F.2d 915, 924-25 (1st Cir. 1988); Barnett v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 953, 962-63 (D.C. Cir.
1987); Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 776 F. Supp. 21, 36 n.38 (D. Mass. 1991),
rev'd on other grounds, 971 F2d 818 (1st Cir. 1992).
81. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. National Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983); United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 225 (1st Cir. 1992);
Greenwood, 776 F. Supp. at 36 n.38. The recent flurry of federal cases analyzing the
retroactive application of § 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the compensatory damages provision, illustrates how a court may evaluate "agency expertise." In order to clarify the proper interpretation of the Act, the EEOC issued a Policy Guidance recommending that § 102 be applied prospectively only. See EEOC Policy-Guidance on Retroactivity
of Civil Rights Act of 1991, Daily Labor Rep. (BNA), Jan. 2, 1992, at D1; see also
Croce v. V.I.P. Real Estate, 786 F. Supp. 1141, 1144 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); United States v.
Department of Mental Health, 785 F. Supp. 846, 848 n.2 (E.D. Cal. 1992). In arriving at
this conclusion, the EEOC evaluated the principle of retroactivity and examined the
leading Supreme Court decisions on the subject. Noting that the "EEOC's expertise does
not encompass analysis of Supreme Court cases," at least one district court has declined
to defer to the agency's interpretation of the Act. See Crumley v. Delaware State College, 797 F. Supp. 341, 347,(D. Del. 1992). For other decisions stating that the courts,
rather than the EEOC, are the experts in evaluating a traditional tool of statutory construction such as retroactivity, see Ayala-Chavez v. INS, 945 F.2d 288, 294 (9th Cir.
1991); Aiken v. Bucks Assoc. for Retarded Citizens, No. 91-2672, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9925, at *37 (E.D. Pa. July 4, 1992); Kennedy v. Fritsch, 796 F. Supp. 306, 311-12 (N.D.
Ill. 1992); Jackson v. Bankers Trust Co., 88 Civ. 4786, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6290, at
*11-12 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 1992).
82. See St. Luke's Hosp. v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 810 F.2d 325, 331
(1st Cir. 1987).
83. See id., 810 F.2d at 331; Greenwood, 776 F. Supp. at 36 n.38; Flagstaff Medical
Ctr. v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 1325, 1344 (D. Ariz. 1991), affd in part, rev'd in part, 962
F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1992).
84. See, e.g., Miree Constr. Corp. v. Dole, 930 F.2d 1536, 1541 (11th Cir. 1991);
Wilshire Westwood Assocs. v. Atlanta Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801, 809 (9th Cir. 1989);
Barnett, 818 F.2d at 962; Flagstaff,773 F. Supp. at 1344-45; Westmiller v. Sullivan, 729 F.
Supp. 260, 265 (W.D.N.Y. 1990).
85. See, e.g., West v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 1122, 1127 (3d Cir. 1989).
86. See, e.g., id. at 1131; Wilcox v. Ives, 864 F.2d 915, 924-25 (1st Cir. 1988);
Barnett, 818 F.2d at 962-63; Greenwood Trust- Co. v. Massachusetts, 776 F. Supp. 21, 36
n.38 (D. Mass. 1991).
87. See, e.g., West, 879 F.2d at 1134 (Mansmann, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
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court was persuaded that the agency satisfied the factors, then it
would afford the agency interpretation a level of persuasive force
in its decision. Acknowledging this persuasive force is a type of judicial deference.89
The concept embodied in Skidmore has had a profound impact on judicial review of agency rules. Even without rulemaking
authority, an agency may state in an interpretive rule how it anticipates it will apply a statute. However, such an interpretive rule
cannot bind the courts as it is not based on delegated lawmaking
authority from Congress. A Court may, if persuaded by the agency's reasoning, adopt the interpretive rule. But if not persuaded, a
court may substitute its own judgment for that of the agency in
administering the statute.
II. THE EROSION OF SKIDMORE V. SWIFT & CO.
A. The Skidmore/Chevron Relationship: Transforming Skidmore
into a Reasonableness Test
In 1984, the Supreme Court, in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,' introduced a broad principle
of judicial deference comprised of a two-prong test that evaluates
an agency interpretation as established by a legislative rule. However, some courts have applied the Chevron test without regard to
the type of agency rule at issue, thus applying the deference of
Chevron, instead of Skidmore, to interpretive rules. Consequently,
Skidmore deference has at times been in danger of being replaced
by the Chevron doctrine.
The then-fifty-year old case of Skidmore v. Swift & Co. could
easily have been overlooked or even overruled after the Chevron
decision; but, in fact, neither of these events occurred. This Part
evaluates how Skidmore has been invoked since the Chevron revolution. It discusses how Skidmore has been molded into a reason-

part) (collecting Third Circuit cases so holding); Wilcox, 864 F.2d at 924-25; Barnett, 818
F.2d at 960-61; St. Luke's Hosp., 810 F.2d at 331; General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus,
742 F.2d 1561, 1565 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Flagstaff, 773 F. Supp. at 1339.
88. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1235 (1991); General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976); Barnett, 818 F.2d at 960-61; Westmiller,
729 F. Supp. at 265.
89. However, the levels of 'deference vary depending on the type of rule that the
court is reviewing. See supra text accompanying notes 7-24.
90. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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ableness test and, in some decisions, incorpdrated into the second
step of the Chevron analysis.
The simplicity and clarity of the Chevron two-prong test were
welcomed by courts that had previously struggled to articulate a
deference standard. However, the breadth of the Chevron doctrine
soon became a central debate in administrative law.91 The Court

itself became engaged in both limiting and expanding the scope of
Chevron.'
As discussed earlier, Chevron was a revolutionary case in
defining judicial deference to agency interpretations promulgated
as legislative rules.93 If a statute is ambiguous, then a court must
defer to any reasonable interpretation that the agency advocates.94
This test specifically applies to "legislative regulations," where
Congress delegated explicit or implicit authority to agencies to
elucidate specific provisions of statutes through their rulemaking
power.95 Lower courts have cited Skidmore while engaging in step
two of the Chevron analysis, the reasonableness inquiry. 6
Typically, a court reviewing an agency rule, regardless of
whether such rule is legislative or interpretive, engages in a Chevron discussion because of the pervasiveness of the Chevron doc-

trine. Once a court is satisfied that a statute is sufficiently ambiguous98 so as to warrant a thorough investigation by the court
into the statute's legislative history and intent, the court moves on
to evaluate the reasonableness of the agency interpretation. During

91. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
92. For decisions limiting Chevron, see supra note 44; for decisions expanding the
scope of Chevron, see Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel Moore, 487
U.S. 354, 381-83 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 981 (1986).
93. In Chevron, the EPA promulgated a regulation defining the terms of a statute
pursuant to a congressional grant of power to make rules. The agency's definition of the
term "stationary source" was challenged by the Natural Resources Defense Council, and
the Court reviewed the validity of the agency's construction. 467 U.S. at 837.
94. See supra text accompanying note 38.
95. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
96. See, e.g., Evans v. Commissioner of Me. Dept. of Human Servs., 933 F.2d 1, 7
(1st Cir. 1991).
97. There are, however, some courts that refrain from invoking Chevron merely because agency action is involved. These courts are usually the same ones that maintain a
distinction between legislative and interpretive rules. See, e.g., Flagstaff Medical Ctr. v.
Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 1325, 1343-44 (D. Ariz. 1991).
98. Determining whether or not a statute is ambiguous has been a source of conflict
within the Supreme Court. See supra note 39.
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this step, the court will often look at the thoroughness of the
agency's investigation, the validity of the agency's reasoning, and
the consistency of the agency's current interpretation with earlier
rulings-the exact criteria of the Skidmore persuasiveness test. In
fact, many courts cite Skidmore as the authority for this evaluation. In these cases, coirts' usages of the Skidmore analysis in
conjunction with the Chevron test transform the Skidmore persuasiveness test into a reasonableness test, oftentimes resulting in the
application of Chevron deference, reserved for legislative rules, to
interpretive rules."
However, the Skidmore persuasiveness test and the reasonableness inquiry of Chevron are not the same test substantively.
The purpose of the Skidmore inquiry into an agency interpretation
is to determine its persuasiveness."° Persuasiveness is used to determine whether or not a court should adopt an agency interpretation; an agency must convince the court of the validity of the
agency's view.' In contrast to the Skidmore persuasiveness test,
the second step of the Chevron test evaluates the reasonableness
99. See DAVIS, supra note 43, at 505; see, e.g., Evans, 933 F.2d at 7; Miree Constr.
Corp. v. Dole, 930 F.2d 1536, 1541 (11th Cir. 1991); Wilshire Westwood Assocs. v. Atlanta Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801, 809 (9th Cir. 1989); West v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 1122,
1134 n.1 (3d Cir. 1989) (Mansmann, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Wilcox v.
Ives, 864 F.2d 915, 924-25 (1st Cir. 1988); St. Luke's Hosp. v. Secretary of Health &
Human Servs., 810 F.2d 325, 331 (1st Cir. 1987); see also Rubin v. Tourneau, Inc., 92
Civ. 0078, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10009, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1992); Savko v. Port
Auth. of Allegheny County, No. 87-2390, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9201, at *11-12 (E.D.
Va. June 26, 1992); Reynolds v. Frank, 786 F. Supp. 168, 169 (D. Conn. 1992).
100. See Barnett v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 953, 964 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also
MDPhysicians & Assocs. v. State Bd. of Ins., 957 F.2d 178, 186 n.9 (5th Cir. 1992) (relying on Skidmore in finding Department of Labor's opinions of persuasive value).
Many of the factors used by the Skidmore court to determine the persuasive power of an interpretive rule are the same as those used to determine if an agency action is
arbitrary and capricious, the standard of judicial review provided by the Administrative
Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). Agency actions struck down as arbitrary and
capricious are rules promulgated without thorough investigation or valid reasoning. See,
e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46-48
(1983); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-16 (1971); Greater
Boston Tel. Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-51 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
923 (1971). Agency positions that fluctuate frequently are also often struck down for
arbitrariness. See, e.g., Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 108-09 (D.D.C. 1973). Courts
applying the arbitrary and capricious review are, in practical effect, assessing the persuasiveness of the agency's rulemaking.
101. Wilcox, 864 F.2d at 924 (agency must rely on the "persuasivepower" of its argument) (quoting Mayburg v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 740 F.2d 100, 106
(1984)); see also MDPhysicians, 957 F.2d at 186 n.9 (noting "persuasive value" of
agency's opinion).
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of the agency's rule. The reasonableness inquiry requires that an
agency simply present a coherent and rational interpretation of the
statute to the court. The implication is that the agency does not
have to "win over" or persuade the court, but rather that the
court must accept the agency interpretation unless it is unreasonable or defies common sense.l"a There is, then, clearly a distinction between the depth of judicial inquiry under Skidmore and
under Chevron: the Skidmore standard of review is much more
difficult for an agency to satisfy.
The result of applying the Skidmore persuasiveness test in the
second part of a Chevron analysis is twofold. First, because a court
that finds an agency interpretation persuasive will most likely find
that interpretation reasonable, one may question the harm of such
an application. However, by imposing the persuasiveness test on
agencies in the context of legislative rules, courts' evaluation of
agency interpretations may be too intrusive. According to Chevron,
agency interpretations with legislative force should be entitled to a
high level of deference. An agency's rule is like a congressional
statute-and the courts must respect the legislative will. Second,
the transformation of the Skidmore criteria into a reasonableness
test incorporates Skidmore into a Chevron analysis. The separate
standards of deference were crafted fifty years apart from one
another in factually discrete situations-the Skidmore doctrine
fashioned for application to interpretive rules, and the Chevron
doctrine for application in the context of legislative regulations. Incorporating Skidmore into Chevron dilutes the significance of Skidmore as the authority on how to evaluate interpretive rules. 3
The courts must recognize that there is an impenetrable wall between legislative and interpretive rules, and that the standards of
judicial deference set forth in Skidmore and Chevron are on opposite sides of it.
B. No Use for Skidmore
Two small but ascending factions advocate views that would
significantly erode the future role of Skidmore. One faction suggests treating legislative and interpretive rules the same with re-

102. West, 879 F.2d at 1124; Flagstaff Medical Ctr. v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 1325,
1338-39 (D. Ariz. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 962 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1992).
103. See Flagstaff,773 F. Supp. at 1344.
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gard to judicial deference, thus applying Chevron in all deference
cases, and effectively rendering obsolete Skidmore's discussion
concerning interpretive rules. The other faction suggests that consistency in interpretations is not necessary for judicial deference to
an agency interpretation, thus minimizing the use of Skidmore as a
persuasiveness test. This Section will address each of these views
separately.
Although some jurists clearly believe that legislative and interpretive rules should no longer be treated differently with regard
to judicial deference, few actually advocate the destruction of the
distinction between legislative and interpretive rules. 4 Rather,
most courts implicitly reject the principle of treating the types of
rules differently. The most prominent and widely used method of
blurring the legislative/interpretive rule distinction is the application of a Chevron analysis when the rule involved is an interpretive one." In Chevron, the Court explicitly stated that "legislative regulations," such as the one in that case, were to be given
controlling weight by the Court if they were reasonable."4 When
courts adopt the extreme deference standard of Chevron for interpretive rules, they ignore the difference between the deference
standard for legislative rules and the deference standard for interpretive rules.
The critical distinction between Chevron and Skidmore is that
when applying the Skidmore deference principle, a court is always
free to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. The court
uses the Skidmore persuasiveness test to weigh the agency interpretation into its final determination of the proper construction of
the statute at issue. The court may choose to adopt fully the
agency's viewpoint, but the choice is unequivocally the court's to
make. Under Chevron, once the court finds a statute ambiguous, it
must defer to a reasonable agency interpretation of that statute.
This doctrine of compelled deference applies only to legislative
rules." When a court eiplains that it is compelled to defer to an

104. For examples of judges who advocate the destruction of the distinction, see
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1236 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment); Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C.
Cir. 1991), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1584 (1992); U.S. Mosaic Tiln Co. v. NLRB, 935 F.2d
1249, 1255 n.6 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Cr. 871 (1992).
105. See, e.g., Wagner Seed, 946 F.2d at 922.
106. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
107. See supra notes 7-24 and accompanying text.
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interpretive rule, it ignores Skidmore and uses Chevron to supplant
it.l"a The merger of the different deference standards deflates the
importance of Skidmore's role as the authoritative pronouncement
on the legal effect of interpretive rules1" and negates the distinction between legislative and interpretive rules.1 '
The second approach to judicial deference that would erode
the role of Skidmore focuses on the consistency component of
Skidmore's persuasiveness test. A growing number of commentators have acknowledged the importance of policymaking considerations in weighing deference questions."' When, in a statute to
be implemented by an agency, Congress creates an ambiguity that
cannot be resolved by the text, the legislative history, or the "traditional tools of statutory construction," the resolution of that
ambiguity necessarily involves policy judgment.' Because policy
considerations can change over time depending on the political
process, it is argued that the consistency factor in evaluating the
persuasiveness or reasonableness of an agency interpretation is
diminished.' These commentators urge the courts to recognize

108. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1564-72 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074 (1985); EEOC v. Tortilleria La Mejor, 758 F.
Supp. 585, 589 (E.D. Cal. 1991); see also Marshall J. Breger, Defining Administrative
Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 268, 274 n.47 (1991) (reviewing PETER L. STRAUSS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (1989)).

109. See supra text accompanying note 52.
110. For a discussion detailing the differences between legislative and interpretive
rules, see supra text accompanying notes 7-24.
111. Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269, 277-78 (1988); Panel Discussion, Developments in Judicial Review with Emphasis on the Concepts of Standing and Deference to the
Agency, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 113, 127 (1990) (comment of Stephen F. Williams); Starr, supra
note 33, at 308-09, 312.
112. See Scalia, supra note 46, at 515. Justice Scalia is in fact critical of this reasoning as a basis for deference. He argues that the underlying reason for deferring to agencies is that when Congress leaves a gap in a statute, it is the intent of Congress to give
the agency the power to fill that gap, and the courts should accordingly respect the agency construction of the statute. Id. at 516. This analysis fails to consider that an agency
without an express delegation of legislative rulemaking power simply lacks the power to
fill these gaps. For a decision demonstrating the application of Justice Sealia's approach,
see Wilshire Westwood Assocs. v. Atlanta Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801, 809 (9th Cir.
1989) (citing Process Gas Consumers Group v. United States, 694 F.2d 778, 791 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (en bane), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 905 (1983)).
113. "While it is generally true that less deference should be accorded to administrative interpretations that lack consistency, an agency is not locked into the first interpretation it espouses." Sacred Heart Medical Ctr. v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 537, 544 (3d Cir.
1992).
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the need for flexibility in agency action and the appropriate role
of political participation in the administrative process.1 4
If courts were to relax the consistency factor of the Skidmore
principle to allow agency interpretations that fluctuate to receive
deference, Skidmore would lose some of its significance as a persuasiveness test. Of all of the persuasiveness criteria, consistency of
the agency's position is the valuation most heavily relied on in
measuring the persuasiveness of an interpretive rule; 15 holding
that consistency is not a necessary component to an evaluation of
the persuasiveness of an agency's rule seriously undermines the
usefulness of the Skidmore test.
The role of Skidmore in the courts could be considerably
curtailed should either of these trends become accepted. A doctrine affording legislative and interpretive rules the same level of
judicial deference would diminish Skidmore's significance as the
guidepost for judicial deference to interpretive rules. Moreover, the
possibility of decreasing the importance of consistency in determining the soundness of agency interpretations would detract from the
position of Skidmore as a guide for determining the persuasiveness
of agency rules.
III.

MAINTAINING THE SKIDMORE TRADITION:

EEOC v. ARAMCO
The Supreme Court has cited Skidmore seven times since
Chevron."6 In each case, the authoring Justice quoted Skidmore
approvingly and based his analysis in some part on Skidmore's
discussion of interpretive rules-without applying the Skidmore
analysis in conjunction with Chevron, or equating the thrust of
Skidmore with a test for agency reasonableness. Rather, the Justices treated Skidmore as the authority on the legal effect of inter-

114. Scalia, supra note 46, at 517.
115. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. Consistency prevents arbitrary
decisionmaking by the agency and provides notice to parties likely to be subject to agency regulation.
116. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991); Martin v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 111 S. Ct. 1171, 1179 (1991); Ansonia
Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 n.6 (1986); Local No. 93, Int'l Assoc. of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 518 (1986); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986); Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 216, 220 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring in result); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S.
237, 270 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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pretive rules. As discussed in earlier portions of this Note, the
significance attached to the Skidmore decision varies in the lower
courts. However, the Justices' opinions elucidate the proper treatment of Skidmore. Aramcon" is the Court's most recent discussion of Skidmore deference. This Part discusses Aramco and the
competing factions within the Court that illustrate the contemporary judicial deference debate.
A.

The Majority's View

Ali Boureslan, a naturalized United States citizen, worked in
Saudi Arabia for a subsidiary of the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), an American corporation. He was discharged from
his duties after working for the company for approximately five
years. Boureslan brought suit against Aramco in federal court under Title VII, alleging that he was harassed and ultimately dismissed by Aramco because of his race, religion, and national origin."'
The district court dismissed Boureslan's claim for want of
subject matter jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed.'
On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that Title VII did not apply extraterritorially to regulate
the employment practices of U.S. companies that employ U.S.
citizens abroad."
Although Aramco raises complicated questions of international law and statutory construction, this Note confines its discussion
of the decision to a domestic administrative law context.12 In

117.

111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).

118. Id. at 1229-30.
119. Boureslan v. Aramco, 653 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Tex. 1987), aff'd, 857 F.2d 1014
(5th Cir. 1988), adopted on reh'g, 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
120. 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1236. The majority of the Court consisted of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. Soon after the decision,
its holding was effectively circumvented by Congress with the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991; that Act provides that Title VII does apply extraterritorially to United
States citizens working abroad. See Sofferin v. American Airlines, 785 F. Supp. 780, 784
n.9 (N.D. Ill. 1992); McCullough v. Consolidated Rail, 785 F. Supp. 1309, 1315 (N.D. Ill.

1992); Conerly v. CVN Co., 785 F. Supp. 801, 805 n.6 (D. Minn. 1992). However, "the
Supreme Court's discussion of the appropriate deference to be afforded to the EEOC
guidelines remains valid." Crumley v. Delaware State College, 797 F. Supp. 341, 347 n.7

(D. Del. 1992).
121. Despite the broad jurisdictional grant of Title VII, the Court refused to apply
the statute extraterritorially without a "clear statement" from Congress authorizing this
construction because of the presumption against extraterritoriality. The case also raised
such important issues as separation of powers and international comity.
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Aramco, the EEOC argued that the Court should defer to the
agency's interpretation of the statute1 2 Although the Court
found Title VII ambiguous," it did not agree with the EEOC's
construction, and declined to defer to the agency position. 4 The
Court reasoned:
In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, we addressed the proper deference to be afforded the EEOC's guidelines. Recognizing that
"Congress, in enacting Title VII, did not confer upon the EEOC
authority to promulgate rules or regulations," we held that the
level of deference afforded "'will depend upon the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factoxs which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.' 22125

In evaluating the EEOC's position under Skidmore's persuasiveness test, the Court found that the agency's interpretation of the
statute was "neither contemporaneous with its enactment nor consistent since the statute came into law." 6 While the Court did
not "wholly discount the weight to be given to the 1988 [EEOC]
guideline," it stated that the guideline's "persuasive value [was]
limited when judged by the standards set forth in Skidmore."' 7
While the Court explicitly stated that Title VII is ambiguous
on its face with respect to its application outside of the United
States, the Court did not even mention the possibility of applying
Chevron deference in this case. Although the Court did not state
its reason for not using a Chevron analysis, one can infer the
reason from the opinion. First, the Court emphasized that Congress provided the EEOC with enforcement and investigative powers, but not with rulemaking power.' The conclusion that follows from this statement is that any ruling issued by the EEOC
must be an interpretive one. 29 Because these rulings were
. 122. Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1235. The EEOC's position encouraged extraterritorial
application of Title VII. Id.
123. Id. at 1231.
124. Id. at 1235.
125. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141,
142 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944))),
126. Id. These very concerns required the Court to reject the EEOC's interpretation
of Title VII in Gilbert sixteen years earlier. See supra note 66.
127. Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1235.
128. Id.
129. Agencies without a delegated congressional grant of rulemaking' power have no
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nonlegislative, the Court did not need to give the agency Chevron
deference; instead, the Court could, and did, apply Skidmore deference principles. Second, the Court's action of freely substituting
its interpretation for the agency's is consistent with a Skidmore,
not a Chevron, analysis. The Court undertook an in-depth evaluation of Title VII and arrived at its own conclusion with regard to
the statute's application. In light of the EEOC's conflicting position that Title VII could be applied abroad, the Court reviewed
the EEOC interpretation to determine its persuasive value. Applying the Skidmore persuasiveness test to the agency position, the
Court found that the agency's interpretation did not "fare well"
and was not entitled to much weight.1"
B. The Concurrence's View
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia differed from the
majority only with regard to the method of determining the level
of deference to be accorded to the EEOC's interpretation of Title
VII. First, he criticized the majority's application of Gilbert; the
case stood for a broader deference principle than the majority
attributed to it. Second, he argued that a Chevron analysis should
have been used in this case,"' citing EEOC v. Commercial Office
Products Co."' Lastly, he noted the competing relationship
between a Chevron analysis and other forms of statutory construction.
Justice Scalia criticized the majority's application of Gilbert as
incorrect and misleading. He restated the majority's position as the
view that the EEOC-not only with respect to the particular point

power to issue rules with legislative force. Even if there were any doubt as to this conclusion, it is evident that in this case the EEOC rulings were all interpretive in nature;
the EEOC attempted to buttress its position before the Court with a 1989 Policy Statemeit supplemented by a 1975 letter from its general counsel, 1983 testimony by its
chairman, and a 1985 decision by the Commissioner. Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1235. The
EEOC argued that all of these informal rulings professed that Title VII could be applied
abroad. Id. Without question, these explanatory rulings are interpretive, and not legislative. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. In addition to the fact that the
EEOC has no authority to issue legislative rules, none of the agency's supporting documents were issued according to the rulemaking procedures mandated by the Administrative Procedure Act and therefore could not be "legislative rules." See Anthony, supra
note 7, at 1322.
130. Aranco, 111 S. Ct. at 1235.
131. Id. at 1236 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
132. 486 U.S. 107 (1988).
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at issue here, but apparently as a general matter-is not entitled
to the deference normally afforded to administrative agencies
under Chevron.'33 He pointed out that Gilbert did not reason that
the EEOC, singled out from other agencies, was not entitled to
deference; rather, "the EEOC's guidelines like the guidelines of all
agencies without explicit rulemaking power, could not be considered legislative
rules and therefore could not be accorded defer134
ence."
The distinction that Justice Scalia raised, while technically
correct, is inconsequential. Gilbert did rely heavily on Skidmore's
analysis concerning interpretive rules. Broadly stated, the reasoning
of the Gilbert opinion espouses nondeferential review for interpretive rules. But the Aramco Court's blanket denial of deference to
the EEOC in particular does not disturb this concept. The EEOC
has no rulemaking power,1 35 and therefore cannot promulgate legislative rules."6 It follows that all EEOC rulings are interpretive
and thus not eligible for Chevron deference. The majority's implication that the EEOC in particular is not afforded Chevron deference like other agencies is correct. While Justice Scalia may have
accurately described the apparent gap in the majority's logic, the
resulting incongruence does not change the effect of the original
discussion in Gilbert.
Far more provocative is Justice Scalia's advocacy of Chevron
deference for the EEOC guidelines in the Aramco case. He asserted that "[i]n an era when our treatment of agency positions is
governed by Chevron, the 'legislative rules vs. other action' dichotomy of Gilbert is an anachronism"; 37 and explained that "[t]he

133. Aramco, Ill S. Ct. at 1236. It is not entirely clear that this is what the majority
meant; but even if it is, the resulting error is innocuous. Some interpretations of Gilbert
do espouse the view that the EEOC is not entitled to the same deference as other government agencies. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Note, Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 1158, 1185 n.117 (1991). This argument finds support from two postChevron cases, Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 n.6 (1986) and Local
93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 517-18 (1986).
134. Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1236 (emphasis in original). For a more complete discussion of Gilbert, see supra text accompanying notes 61-68.
135. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(4) (1988).
136. When an agency does not have authority to promulgate legally binding rules, the
rulings of the agency are interpretive. Joseph v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140, 1154
n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
137. Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1236. Justice Scalia is the leading critic of the usefulness
of maintaining the legislative/interpretive rule distinction. See supra at notes 104, 112-14
and accompanying text.
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case relied upon for the proposition that the EEOC's interpretations have only the force derived from their 'power to persuade'
was decided in an era when we were disposed to give deference
(as opposed to 'persuasive force') only to so-called 'legislative regulations.' "138

Justice Scalia's analysis clarified his position that Chevron
should be the sole authority on judicial deference; his statements,
however, do not accurately reflect the current state of the law.
First, Chevron involved a legislative rule, and the Court has not
expanded the doctrine to encompass all other agency action; 39
thus, the assertion that Chevron governs judicial treatment of all
agency action does not find support in Supreme Court precedent.
In addition, while it is true that the "power to persuade" type of
deference which Justice Scalia criticized was developed sixty years
prior to Chevron, it is still broadly applied and has not been overruled by the Court.14 Indeed, the Aramco majority relied on
Skidmore's reasoning, and moreover, had invoked Skidmore just
one week before the Aramco decision, in an opinion that Justice
Scalia joined. 4'

Justice Scalia supported his arguments that Gilbert stood for a
limited principle and that Chevron should have been applied to
the Aramco facts by referring to a decision issued three years
prior to Aramco, EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co. 4 In
Commercial Office Products, the Court said that "the EEOC's
interpretation of ambiguous language need only be reasonable to
be entitled to deference."' 43 Justice Scalia noted cogently that the
language used in Commercial Office Products is similar to that in
cases that follow Chevron. Disturbed that the Court failed to
T

138. Aranco, 111 S. Ct. at 1236.

139. Some courts have suggested that Chevron 'deference should be accorded to
agency adjudications. See, e.g., U.S. Mosaic Tile Co. v. NLRB, 935 F.2d 1249, 1255 n.6
(11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 871 (1992).
140. In fact, the Court has reaffirmed its approval of the "power to persuade" deference of Skidnore six times since Chevron. See supra note 116.
141. See Martin v. OSHR, 111 S.Ct. 1171, 1179 (1991).
142. 486 U.S. 107 (1988). Justice Scalia did not join the majority opinion which deferred to the EEOC. Instead, he joined Justice Stevens's dissent which found no ambiguity in the meaning of the statute, which would have ended his inquiry under the Chevron
test.
143. Id. at 115.
144. Aramco, 111 S.Ct. at 1236 (Scalia, J.,concurring). In looking at whether a statute is "ambiguous" or not, the Court engages in a traditional analysis to discern whether

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:166

mention Commercial Office Products in its analysis, Justice Scalia
declared that after .Aramco "the state
of the law regarding defer145
unsettled.
left
is
EEOC
the
to
ence
In order to assess Justice Scalia's attack on the omission of
Commercial Office Products from the majority's analysis, it is helpful to analyze that decision briefly. In Commercial Office Products,
the Court did not mention Chevron. The Court's silence about
Chevron could mean either that the Court was unaware of Chevron or that it made a conscious decision not to use the analysis
from Chevron.46 On the first point, the Court could not have
been unaware of Chevron.'47 Secondly, the Commercial Office
Products quote resembling Chevron Janguage cites as its authority
a pre-Chevron case, Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, as the basis of
its analysis. 48 Oscar Mayer, in turn, relied on Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. 49 in deferring to the EEOC. Griggs said that EEOC
interpretations were entitled to "great deference."'' " However, in
Gilbert, the Court reconciled Griggs' "great deference" with its
analysis of the EEOC guidelines in its discussion of the legal effect
of interpretive rules. 5' The Gilbert Court explained that it did
not mean to say that EEOC guidelines are not entitled to "consideration in determining legislative intent," but rather that, since
the guidelines were only interpretive rules, they could be accorded
less weight than other rules that have the force of law. Gilbert explained that "[tihe most comprehensive statement of the role of
interpretive rulings such as the EEOC guidelines is found in

the meaning of the statute is clear on its face before it looks beyond the statute to
legislative history or agency interpretations. Use of the term "ambiguous" in conjunction
with "reasonable" does not automatically mean the Court is applying Chevron deference.
The Court's hesitation to use Chevron deference, in both Commercial Office Products and
Aramco, confirms that the Court continues to recognize and preserve the distinct deference standards of Chevron and Skidmore as applied to legislative and interpretive rules,
respectively..
145. Id.
146. This analysis is borrowed from Kenneth Culp Davis's discussion of Chevron's
apparent conflict with § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act. DAVIS, supra note 43,
at 510-11.
147. Id.
148. Commercial Office Prods., 486 U.S. at 115 (citing Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans,
441 U.S. 750, 761 (1979)).
149. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
150. Id.at 434.
151. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976). For a more complete
discussion of Gilbert, see supra text accompanying notes 61-68.
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Skidmore v. Swift & Co."' Commercial Office Products, then,
contrary to Justice Scalia's interpretation, is not an example of the
Court's acceptance of a Chevron analysis for EEOC guidelines;
rather, it is an affirmation of a prior line of cases consistent with
and relying on Skidmore.53 Justice Scalia would decide the Aramco case as follows: he
would assume that the EEOC was entitled to deference, and then
apply a Chevron analysis. Agreeing with the majority in finding
the statute ambiguous, Justice Scalia would move on to step two
of the Chevron test. He noted that "deference is not an abdication, and it requires us to accept only those agency interpretations
that are reasonable in light of the principles of construction courts
normally employ."1" Because there is a presumption against extraterritoriality in interpreting statutes, and the requirement that
the intent of Congress to overcome this presumption be "clearly
expressed," Justice Scalia would conclude that the agency interpretation of the statutory language to the contrary was not reasonable. 5
C. The Dissent's View
Led by Justice Marshall, the dissent156 agreed with the majority that the Skidmore standard of deference should be used in
this decision; however, it disagreed with the majority's determination that the EEOC's interpretation was not entitled to persuasive
weight. Quoting Commercial Office Products, Justice Marshall
advocated deference to the interpretation of the EEOC because it
was persuasive. 5' He emphasized the consistency of the EEOC

152. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 141 (citations omitted).
153. In addition, the deference in Commercial Office Products rested on the EEOC's
responsibility as primary enforcer of the statute. Kennedy v. Fritsch, 796 F. Supp. 306,
311 (N.D. Ill.
1992). The "logical foundation for [this] holding is porous"; the EEOC's
power to sue under Title VII does not create a power "to tell the courts how to interpret the substantive provisions of that statute." Id. at 311 n.5.
154. Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1237 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration
After Chevron, 90 COLUM L. REV. 2071, 2114 (1990)). Professor Sunstein's article provides an excellent analysis for fitting Chevron into the broader framework of statutory
construction. He explains which canons of construction outweigh Chevron and which do
not.
155. Id.(citing Sunstein, supra note 154, at 2114).
156. Id. at 1237 (Marshall, J.,dissenting, joined by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.).
157. Id. at 1245. Two of the three dissenting Justices in Aramco were in the majority
in Commercial Office Products.
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position to apply Title VII extraterritorially, and the reinforcement
of the EEOC interpretation by the Department of Justice:15 "In
sum, there is no reason not to give effect to the considered and
consistently expressed views of the two agencies [the EEOC and
the Department of Justice] assigned to enforce Title VII."' 9
Whereas the Aramco dissent does not discuss its view concerning
deference to the EEOC as fully as do the majority or the concurrence, its application of Commercial Office Products and evaluation
of the consistency of the agency's position indicate a Skidmore
inquiry.
Another case decided one week before Aramco, Martin v.
Occupational Health & Safety Commission,1" further illuminates
the views of the Justices participating in the Aramco dissent. In
that case, a unanimous Court161 held that a reviewing court
should defer to the Secretary of the Department of Labor over
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission when the
interpretations of the two interpretive bodies conflict.162 Relying
on Skidmore, the Court explained that although informal rulings
(such as the one in Martin) were not entitled to the same deference as legislative rules, they had persuasive force on judicial
review: "A reviewing'court may certainly consult them to determine whether the [agency] has consistently applied the interpretation embodied in the citation, a factor bearing on the reasonable-

158. 1d. Stating the position of the Justice Department, then-Assistant Attorney General Scalia testified before Congress that the framework of Title VII implied that it protected United States citizens employed anywhere in the world. Foreign Investment and
Arab Boycott Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Finance of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 159, 165
(1975).
159. Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1246.
160. 111 S. Ct. 1171 (1991). Martin was decided on March 20, 1991; Aramco was
decided on March 26, 1991.
161. It is interesting to note that Justice Scalia in fact joined the Court in its application of Skidmore just one week prior to his Aramco concurrence challenging the validity pf Skidmore's deference principles.
162. Both are administrative bodies within the Department of Labor.
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ness of the [agency's] position." ' This analysis is consistent with
Skidmore, not Chevron, deference principles.
The analysis of the Court in Martin is consistent with that in

Aramco. Although addressing different issues, the Court used
Skidmore deference in both situations. Currently, seven of the Jus-

tices are of the view that Skidmore is still a viable doctrine."

M

IV.

THE REVIVAL OF SKIDMORE V. SWIFT & CO.:
PRESERVING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
LEGISLATIVE AND INTERPRETIVE RULES

Interpretive rules must be distinguished from legislative
rules.'65 Interpretive rules are not binding on the courts; courts
are free to substitute their judgment for that of an agency in inter-

preting a statute. Legislative rules are supported by a congressional
delegation of power to the agency; courts are not free to displace

agency interpretations with their own. 66 The fundamental distinction between legislative and interpretive rules is that legislative

rules have the binding force of law and interpretive rules do not.
Keeping the legislative/interpretive rule distinction intact conforms with democratic principles and complies with the law. 6
This is so for three reasons. First, general principles of separation
of powers require the distinction. Second, the Administrative Pro-

cedure Act mandates different procedural requirements for the two
types of rules. Third, the distinction preserves the legitimacy of

agency actions.

163. Martin, 111 S. Ct. at 1179. The Court's use of "reasonableness" and "persuasiveness" interchangeably creates confusion in this area. When applying a Chevron analysis, reasonableness is the appropriate term because it implies minimal review by the court.
However, when a court is applying a Skidmore analysis, it should use Skidmore's language, namely persuasiveness, to define the agency's interpretation. The Martin Court's
substitution of reasonableness for persuasiveness clouds the true meaning of the terms and
the competing levels of judicial inquiry.. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
164. The majority in Aramco, coupled with the majority in Commercial Office Products and bolstered by Martin's unanimous decision, indicate that all the Justices except
Scalia and Thomas support the continued application of Skidmore's cautious deference.
Whereas it is clear that Justice Scalia emphatically rejects such a standard, see supra note
137-38 and accompanying text, Justice Thomas's views on Skidmore deference are not yet
clear.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 7-24.
166. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
167. DAVIS, supra note 43, at 54.
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Separation of Powers

Agencies can make legislative rules that create rights, impose
obligations, and bind the public. Courts defer to these rules because the force behind them is derived from a congressional grant
of power. When an agency promulgates an interpretive rule that
creates rights, imposes obligations, or binds the public, it is violating the separation of ppwers doctrine, as it is acting without
congressionally delegated legislative authority.
An agency may promulgate binding rules because Congress
has delegated its lawmaking power to the agency. When an agency
enacts an interpretive rule, the source of the rule is the agency
itself, not Congress; this necessarily limits the breadth of interpretive rulemaking. A representative democracy allows the public to
elect representatives to legislate; legislative powers derive their
force from the people. When an agency legislates without a grant
of power from Congress (that is to say, when it creates a rule that
is legislative in nature), and therefore without the permission of
the public, it circumvents the fundamental role of public participation in the legislative process."
When an agency enacts a rule without a congressional grant
of power, that rule is necessarily an interpretive one. If a court
defers to an interpretive rule, it is deferring to the agency and to
the agency alone. 69 A doctrine mandating blind deference to interpretive rules subjugates the federal courts to the whims of nonelected, politically appointed agency heads."' Clearly, by deferring to an interpretive rule, a court abandons its role to "say what
the law is." ''
However, when a court defers to a legislative rule, the court
is not abdicating its role to interpret the laws. Courts may not act
as super-legislatures. Chevron requires courts to apply a statute the
way Congress intended it to be applied." Courts still interpret

168. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 703 (D.C. Cir, 1980).
169. There is an important difference between blind deference and active review by a
court. A court may give an interpretive rule the force of law by applying a Skidmore
analysis. In applying the Skidmore test, a court may, once it actively evaluates the statute
on its own and weighs the persuasive power of the agency's position, give the interpretive rule the force of law by deferring to it.
170. See Panel Discussion, suprd note 39, at 369 (statement of Cass R. Sunstein).
171. See supra note 6.
172. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-44 (1984).
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the law, but are supposed to do so in a way that gives effect to
congressional intentions. When a court defers to a legislative rule,
the court is deferring to congressional intent; it was Congress's intent to delegate its lawmaking power to the agency.'
B. Administrative Procedure Act
In order for an agency to exercise its legislative rulemaking
power validly, an agency must follow the rulemaking procedure of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). When an agency seeks
to create an interpretive rule, on the other hand, it does not have
to follow these procedures. 4 Congress provided for different procedural practices because it recognized a difference between the
two types of rules.
The APA was enacted with the goals of fairness and protecting the public. 5 It provides for due process in agency adjudications and for rulemaking hearings "on the record."'76 Even its
informal rulemaking procedures provide for extensive public participation in the rulemaking process.' By requiring agencies to follow the rulemaking procedure prescribed in the APA for legislative rules, Congress guaranteed the opportunity for public participation in the quasi-legislative process. Congress did not provide
formal procedures for the interpretive rulemaking process because
the rules do not affect the public in the same intimate ways as
legislative ones. In addition, interpretive rules are not binding' and
are also more likely to be procedural7 or instructive'79 in na173. See id. at 843-44 (describing Congress' gap-filling delegation to agencies).
174. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1988). However, Professor Anthony suggests that agencies
should follow at least informal notice-and-comment procedures if they are in fact promulgating an interpretive rule or policy statement that effectively binds the public. See generally Anthony, supra note 7.
175. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 700-04 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see Panel Discussion, supra note 39, at 368 (statement of Cass R. Sunstein).
176. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988).
177. Informal rulemaking is done through a notice-and-comment process. 5 U.S.C. §§
551, 553 (1988). In theory, notice-and-comment works like this: An agency publishes its
proposed rule in the Federal Register and invites comments from the public. Any person
or organization may submit comments to the agency. The agency then considers the comments, and incorporates the public's ideas and suggestions for changes into the rule. The
problem with notice-and-comment is that even though it is not as burdensome as formal
rulemaking on the record, it still drains a considerable amount of agency resources. See
generally Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process,
41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992).
178. See, e.g., Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Secretary of the Navy, 843 F.2d 528,
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ture. Lastly, Congress recognized that courts would actively review
interpretive rules, therefore guarding a nonparticipating public
from overzealous administrators.
C. Legitimacy
In addition to APA requirements, it is simply not good practice for courts to defer to interpretive rules. The APA was enacted
to establish rulemaking and adjudicative procedures for the agencies to follow. Interpretive rules are explicitly exempt from these
proceedings. If courts allow agencies to accomplish legislative ends
through interpretive rules, courts allow agencies to circumvent the
procedures set down by Congress. Agencies will most certainly
take advantage of this "loophole." This is not to suggest that agencies are power-grabbers, but rather that it would simply be easier
18
for agencies to create rules without public "interference.'
Rulemaking, as established by the APA, is complicated and tmeconsuming, and requires extensive use of an agency's already limited resources.18' Even "informal" notice-and-comment can have
profound draining effects on agencies." It is fairly safe to assume that given the choice, an agency would rather risk an inter-

538-39 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 770 F.2d 779, 783 (9th Cir. 1985); American Meat Inst. v. Bergland, 459 F.
Supp. 1308, 1314 (D.D.C. 1978).
179. See, e.g., Taunton Mun. Lighting Plant v. Department of Energy, 669 F.2d 710,
714-15 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982); Gosman v. United States, 573 F.2d 31, 39 (Ct. Cl.
1978); see also McKenzie v. Heckler, 602 F. Supp. 1150, 1159 (D. Minn. 1985) (defining
an interpretive rule as "one that simply explains and sets forth with greater specificity
that which a statute already requires"), rev'd on other grounds, 787 F.2d 1216 (8th Cir.
1986).
180. See Anthony, supra note 7, at 1317-18; cf Panel Discussion, supra note 39 at
368 (statement of Cass R. Sunstein):
[T]hose who are limited in their authority by law should not be the judge of
those limits. Administrative agencies are constrained by statute, that is, law, and
the mere fact that the statute is ambiguous shouldn't give the agency, of all
people, the authority to decide on the meaning of the limitation. The cute way
in which it's sometimes put is that foxes shouldn't guard henhouses. If Chevron
is taken to mean that agencies judge the scope of their own authority, then one
has precisely that problem.
181. Formal rulemaking requires an intensive trial-like hearing on the record; informal
rulemaking requires an agency to propose rules to the public in order to solicit response
and then to evaluate the various suggestions in order to re-work the rule. See 5 U.S.C. §
553 (1988).
182. See Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985
DUKE L.J. 381, 402-04; E. Donald Elliot, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490,
1494 (1992).
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pretive rule being challenged in the courts, than expend, up-front,
the time, effort, and money to follow the APA procedure for
legislative rules.183 If the interpretive rule is challenged, and a
court defers to the rule with only the minimal "reasonableness"
requirement of step two of the Chevron test,"8 the agency may
have a good chance of acquiring the force of law for that interpretive rule through the court's deference. Agencies can therefore
achieve the effect of a binding rule without following, and in
knowing violation of, the APA's mandated procedures. The probability of judicial deference therefore encourages the agencies to
purposefully circumvent congressional statutes.
Preserving distinct levels of review for legislative and interpretive rules ensures that agencies will maintain legitimacy. The public
presumes that agencies promulgate legislative rules according to
the procedures in the APA, which allow for public participation.85 The public also presumes that if an agency enacts interpretive rules, which are in fact legislative in nature, without public
participation, a court will review the agency interpretation of the
statute using the cautious Skidmore persuasiveness test so as to
protect the public from abusive agency action.'86 Active and
searching review by the courts discourages agencies from overstepping their boundaries and provides for open government and fairness in the administrative and regulatory system.
V.

CONCLUSION

The significance of the Skidmore decision is twofold. First, it
established the legal effect of interpretive rules. According to
Skidmore, interpretive rules do not bind courts; rather, the rules
provide guidance to courts seeking to interpret statutes. This principle is rooted in the legislative/interpretive rule distinction which

183. Cf. Elliot, supra note 182, at 1491.
184. Courts should only apply Chevron deference to legislative rules. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); see also supra
text accompanying notes 41-42.
185. See Arthur E. Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to
Public Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 541
(1970).
186. While it is true that courts are not infallible and are themselves "undemocratic"
in nature, the principle of the courts as interpreters of the law is built into our constitutional structure. See Panel Discussion, supra note 39, at 371 (statement of Cass R.
Sunstein).
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recognizes the fundamental role of public participation in the
agency rulemaking process. Because interpretive rules, as opposed
to legislative rules, are not promulgated pursuant to notice-andcomment, they cannot bind courts.
Second, Skidmore created a standard of deference for courts
reviewing interpretive rules. The decision counsels courts to evaluate the persuasiveness of agency positions and suggests factors for
courts to consider when weighing the value of interpretive rules.
In contrast, the Chevron decision offers a competing approach to
judicial deference to agency action and has assumed a dominant
role with respect to deference to agencies. Some judges' rejection
and misapplication of Skidmore have endangered the distinctiveness of its deference principles and have displaced Skidmore with
a Chevron analysis. Instead, courts should recognize the unique
value of the deference principles of the two decisions. The doctrine of extreme deference mandated by Chevron applies to legislative rules; once a court determines that a statute is ambiguous, it
must defer to any reasonable interpretation of the statute proposed by the agency. On the other hand, the cautious deference
principle established in Skidmore requires agencies to demonstrate
the persuasiveness of their positions; the court engages in a searching inquiry into agency interpretations.
Skidmore remains the authoritative statement on the legal
effect of interpretive rules. But even more importantly, the United
States Supreme Court in EEOC v. Aramco confirmed that in'an
era of increasing judicial deference, courts must preserve the imperative distinction between legislation and interpretive rules by
recognizing the continuing viability of the deference principles set
forth in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.

